Make Fannie’s Deal No Worse Than TARP
Aug/090
Given Freddie Mac’s recently report profitable 2nd quarter earnings report, it is time for Treasury Secretary Geithner to amend the terms of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Plan with the Treasury to be comparable to the preferred stock purchases the Treasury made in commercial banks last October under TARP.
Reasons to Change Fannie and Freddie’s Deal with the Treasury
1. Fannie and Freddie should not have a materially worse deal than the banks just because their deal was cut 4 weeks before TARP.
2. Fannie and Freddie are critical to the domestic economy as they have been the only source of mortgage capital for the past 12 months.
3. The mortgage market will need private capital in the future and cannot rely on government support forever, so Fannie and Freddie will have to raise more capital in the future. If the GSEs are going to raise capital in the future, the Treasury is going to have to treat existing capital better than its current deal with the GSEs.
4. Fannie and Freddie incurred higher expenses because they were team players and supported the Obama Administration’s economic recovery plan. Changing their deal would be a small payback for the support they have given the country and the Administration.
5. Recognition that placing the GSEs in conservatorship was a political attack by led by former Treasury Secretary Paulson.
6. Recognition that former Treasury Secretary Paulson caused a decline in the GSEs stock prices by not outlining the terms under which he would provide capital to the GSEs in the July 2008 legislation. Sec. Paulson then used circular reasoning in claiming that the GSEs had to be taken over because they had low stock prices and couldn’t raise capital. In fact, they couldn’t raise capital because he would not state the terms of a potential future Treasury investment.
7. Paulson’s reasoning for the harsh treatment of GSE shareholders was that shareholders had to pay for the poor risks taken by the companies’ management teams. I disagree since many shareholders were giving advice to the respective managements to raise capital and reduce risk. Rich Pzena was the most outspoken shareholder on this point. Plus, Paulson reversed his position on this issue once he was proven wrong with his handling of the Lehman situation and treated the bank shareholders on much more friendly terms.
8. Eliminating the dividend on Fannie and Freddie’s preferred stockholders was a failed experiment on the part of Sec. Paulson and destroyed the new issuance market for preferred stock. It also hurt many small banks that held Fannie and Freddie preferred stock in their portfolios.
9. GSE preferred stock is still primarily owned by small banks. When dividends are restored, the value of the preferred stock will increase by 10x. This will add approximately $30 billion in restored capital to the commercial banking industry. If banks levered this capital 12x, this raises industry lending capacity by $360 billion.
10. The losses by the GSEs since entering conservatorship have been inflated because a) they are mostly write-downs of deferred tax-assets which the companies still retain and b) the credit reserve build was bigger than expected because Sec. Paulson sent the economy into a tailspin by not providing an orderly wind down to Lehman Brothers.
Terms to Change
1. Lower Preferred Stock Coupon to 5% from 10%. There is no justification for the GSEs to pay a higher coupon than the banks.
2. Change the Treasury’s warrant from 79.99% of the GSEs’ equity to terms identical to the warrant deal received by the banks under TARP. Similar to the preceding point, there is no justification for the GSEs to give the U.S. a higher equity stake for than the banks did.
3. Make the Treasury’s preferred stock pari passu with existing preferred stock. This is another move to equal the banks’ deal under TARP
4. Eliminate asset size restrictions on Fannie and Freddie’s mortgage portfolios. This provision proves my Republican conspiracy theory for placing the GSEs into conservatorship. There is no reason to shrink the GSEs at this point. We need the GSEs to expand their balance sheets. The Fed has temporarily stepped into the breached left by the GSEs not growing. But, what is going to happen when the Fed steps back from the mortgage market? We need the GSEs to support the market as the Fed reduces its balance sheet.
The GSEs deal with the Treasury Secretary should be updated to be similar to the deal the banks received under TARP. Based on the nobler GSE housing mission, there is an argument that they should be treated better than the banks. The banks have no legs to stand on because the FDIC insurance they receive from the federal government is a larger subsidy than the implicit guarantee Fannie and Freddie enjoy.
Anti-Government Banker Builds Career on Government Subsidy
Aug/090
This weekend’s New York Times had a flattering Andrew Martin article on BB&T’s John Allison. I think it is joke for Allison to benefit from a huge government subsidy like FDIC insurance and at the same time, to present himself as anti-government/objectivist. His thought process is intellectually dishonest. He talks as though banks are purely private institutions and would still exist in their current form without FDIC insurance. I have news for him: banks exist today only because of the federal government provides backstop FDIC deposit insurance.
FDIC insurance is a large government subsidy program to help bankers attract deposits. FDIC insurance is critical to a bank because most of the value of a bank comes from its deposit base. With FDIC insurance, bank customers (depositors) are indifferent to the safety of the bank. Instead, depositors base their choice of banks based on rates offered, levels of customer service and branch locations. Without FDIC insurance, banks would have to run with much lower levels of leverage and much high levels of liquidity to attract deposits based on safety and stability. These measures would guard against bank panics or runs; however, lower leverage and higher liquidity would also dampen profitability for the bank.
Another beef I have with Allison is his blaming the housing crisis on Fannie and Freddie. It has been well documented that Wall Street led the credit bubble in the housing market with the expansion of the non-agency mortgage market, specifically the explosion in subprime and Alt-A lending. Fannie and Freddie lost market share from 2002 to 2007. If they were losing market share, how did their actions lead the housing market to its bubble status? See the series of articles on Univ. of Oregon Prof. Mark Thoma’s blog for a more complete discussion on how Wall Street led the mortgage market to a credit bubble. Allison’s blame of Fannie and Freddie seems like a convenient, popular position that fits into his distorted anti-government view.
If Allison truly wants to prove he lives his life abiding by Ayn Rand’s objectivist philosophy, he should have BB&T’s board vote to renounce the company’s bank charter. Then, we’ll see how long a bank run by an objectivist is able to maintain its depositor base and remain in business. I suspect the bank wouldn’t last long.
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